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STEVEN J. EAGLE'

Environmental Amenities, Private

Property, and Public Policy
ABSTRACT
Environmental amenities, like beautiful vistas and famous
natural landmarks, are highly valued by many people, but it is
difficult to determine what would constitute an optimal supply of
them. Since enjoyment of an amenity by one person does not
preclude enjoyment by many others, and it is impracticalto limit
such enjoyment to those who pay, individuals have an incentive
to understate their demand for environmental amenities, thus
leading to their underproduction. On the other hand, interest
groups might spur government to overestimate the unarticulated
demand. Furthermore,much demand is not policy relevant, since
individuals with a moderate taste for particularamenities might
be more than surfeited by the supply that others voluntarily
provide. Building upon this framework, the author contends that
commonly employed methodologies for ascertaining the value of
amenities are seriouslyflawed, and that attempts to provide very
high levels of amenities without commensurate public expenditures may damage privateproperty rights.
Mae West, who was an actress and not an economist, once
observed, "too much of a good thing is wonderful."' Miss West also
supplied considerable insight into how such a happy state of affairs
might be obtained. When someone gasped "my goodness" upon seeing
her diamonds, she responded, "Goodness had nothing to do with it."2
Miss West was not bereft of an understanding of market principles or,
for that matter, of the value of what one might call the amenities of life.
I. POLICY-RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES IN A
PARETIAN WORLD
Parties in consensual relationships do not purchase "too much"
of any good, since the subjective value of the resources they thereby
*. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia
22201 (seagle@gmu.edu).
1. JOSEPH WEINTRAUB, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF MAE WEST (1967), quoted in Edward
A. Dauer, Judicial Policingof Consumer Arbitration,1 PEPP. DISp. RESOL. L.J. 91, 91 (2000).
2. NIGHT AFTER NIGHT (Paramount Pictures 1932) (quoted in BARTLET'S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 736 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002)).
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would exchange exceeds the value of the goods they would obtain.
Possibly, Miss West meant that the quantity of diamonds that would
satisfy others was insufficient for her. Perhaps her meaning was
normative rather than positive. The taste for diamonds among others
similarly situated should not easily be sated, either.3 In either event, a
new owner akin to Mae West would revel in a quantity of diamonds
beyond the demands of those with more abstemious tastes or who
possessed endowments of lesser exchange value.
On the other hand, those obtaining goods through agents may
well acquire too much of a good thing. Agency costs include shirking,
manifested through indifference to the real wants of their principals.
Agents may further their own agendas, which include opportune
yielding to the blandishments or threats of others. In any event, it is
difficult and expensive for one to learn the preferences of another, which
contributes to the fact that "it is generally impossible for the principal or
the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal
decisions from the principal's viewpoint." 4 The problem becomes more
difficult when the principal cannot be relied upon to disclose to the agent
the value that he or she places on the good.
A classic response to the suspicion of undisclosed value is to
assume that the value is high and to obtain goods accordingly. Even
though the result is likely to be iatrogenic, the agent is aggrandized by
acting and is spurred to action by interested groups. Where the agent is a
government agency, the results are no different. "[M ] arket forces provide
strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve private rather
than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers to
the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups."5 It is the
brave adviser, then, who would counsel the agent, "Don't just do
6
something, stand there!"
That brave adviser, with respect to government provision of
environmental amenities, is Professor David Haddock. In his article
"When are Environmental Amenities Policy-Relevant?," 7 Haddock
3. Recall the popular song that sums up this attitude. Jule Styne & Leo Robin,
Diamonds Are a Girl's Best Friend,in GENTLEMEN PREFER BLONDES (Original Broadway Cast
1949).
4. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 308 (1976).
5. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 223, 224 (1986).
6. Thoughts on the Business of Life, FORBES, Dec. 1, 1977, at 140 (attributing quotation to
Dean Acheson).
7. David D. Haddock, When Are Environmental Amenities Policy-Relevant?, 44 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 383 (2004).
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demonstrates the strong possibility that amenities are not undersupplied
in the absence of governmental intervention. Furthermore, even if there
is an undersupply, Haddock maintains that government is ill equipped
to deal with it. The best intervention might be no intervention.
The genesis of the environmental amenities problem lies in the
distinctions among "private goods," "public goods," and "collective
goods." 8 Since public goods are nonrivalrous, the aggregate demand for
them is the sum of the demands of individuals. Environmental amenities
in large part are collective goods, since it is impossible or impractical to
exclude individuals from them.9 Individuals have an incentive to feign
indifference to collective goods from which they derive significant
benefit, since they expect to externalize the costs of environmental
amenities by free riding on the willingness of others to pay. However,
since articulated willingness to pay is our most robust measurement of
demand, the demand we perceive might be considerably less than the
actual demand for collective goods. Furthermore, if no one expresses
willingness to pay, the potential Kaldor-Hicks benefit to society from the
amenities would be foregone. 10
Haddock quotes Harold Demsetz's skepticism that individuals
will step forward to provide collective goods" but regards this, correctly,
in my view, as "overstat[ing] the problem." 12 Many individuals do
volunteer to provide collective environmental amenities and their
altruism, in this sense, means that "rational action need not be
considered optimally efficient ex ante (as in economics), it need only be

8. Following Haddock, I will define a "private good" as a rivalrous good (i.e., its
consumption by one person would foreclose consumption by anyone else. A "public good"
is one that is non-rivalrous in consumption (e.g., a television program). A "collective good"
is a public good from which the exclusion of individuals is impractical (i.e., national
defense). See id. at 400-01.
9. The mere existence of the environmental amenity gives utility to many people. See
infra text accompanying notes 41-46.
10. Under the Kaldor-Hicks test, if those benefiting from a rule or action could, in
theory, fully compensate the losers and still have a net gain, the rule or action is considered
efficiency enhancing (a Kaldor-Hicks "improvement" even though the compensation
payments are not made). See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpreseral Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
11. Haddock, supra note 7, at 404-05 (quoting Harold Demsetz, The Private Production
of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 306 (1970) ("the private production of collective goods,
for which the cost of excluding nonpurchasers is great, does not seem to be practical")).
12. Id.
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considered effective." 13 The growth and success of private land
stewardship and of environmental organizations illustrates the point.14
That said, there remains the strong perception of a large gap
between the (largely unrevealed) demand for and supply of collective
environmental amenities. The provision of such goods by government is
said to ameliorate this problem, since the State alone has the ability to
exact payment from those who enjoy the good but are unwilling to step
forward. Thus, the production of environmental amenities will be
optimized and funded. As Haddock notes, "It seems intuitive that
chronic externalities beg for public policy initiatives." 15
There are a few problems, however. One is the likelihood that
government will get the solution to the problem wrong. Centralized
planners are unable to discern and act in timely fashion upon local
knowledge.' 6 A planned economy deprives planners of the very
information they need to plan properly-market prices that embody
information about preferences, resources, and technology. 17 Also,
through regulatory capture, public agencies established to regulate
industries become subservient to them. 18
An even more fundamental problem with centralized solutions
is the likelihood that there is no underlying problem. Haddock builds
upon James Buchanan and William Stubblebine's seminal article,
Externality.'9 "The nearly lost point of Externality is that more often even
13. Trevor M. Knox, The Volunteer's Folly and Socio-Economic Man: Some Thoughts on
Altruism, Rationality, and Community, 28 J. SoCIo-ECON. 475,477 (1999).
14. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Contested Landscapes and Local Voice, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 513, 535 (2000) (discussing private land conservation trusts). As of 1999, The Nature
Conservancy had a membership of slightly over one million. At the same time, the
National Wildlife Fund had 835,000 members and the World Wildlife Fund 800,000
members. The next three largest groups, the Sierra Club, the National Parks Conservation
Association, and the National Audubon Society, each had almost 400,000 members. David
B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions: Charity Builds Assets on
Corporate Partnerships,WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at Al. The Nature Conservancy, which
has $3 billion in assets, recently was the subject of extensive criticism for "its strategy of
combining conservation and business, including its own pursuit of for-profit ventures,
[which] has led to some costly misadventures and awkward positions." Id. at A25.
15. Haddock, supra note 7, at 387.
16. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REv. 519,52425 (1945).
17. Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in
COLLECrivIST ECONOMIC PLANNING 87 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1935).
18. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SC. 3, 3 (1971) ("[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit."); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture,
PublicInterest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 167, 169 (1990).
19. James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371
(1962).
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chronic externalities are irrelevant .... Externalities, positive and negative,
20
Haddock
are everywhere, but usually economically meaningless."
illustrates the point through such accounts as Ted Turner's Flying D
Ranch in southwestern Montana, which provides passers-by with
spectacular views of indigenous animals and those brought by Turner to
the site.2 ' While motorists value the wealthy Turner's efforts, they would
not pay for them to be further enhanced. Their enjoyment is a positive
externality, but one not policy-relevant.
It is important to note that Buchanan and Stubblebine emphasize
that potentially relevant externalities become actually relevant through
22
In the case of
consensual, and therefore Pareto superior, exchange.
provision of collective environmental amenities, however, free riding
generally precludes the internalization of externalities, including some
that might be policy relevant. Government efforts to force internalization
of the costs of meeting the perceived latent demand for environmental
amenities are rough-hewn affairs. Many not actually deriving enjoyment
from the amenities would be taxed and regulated for the benefit of
others. The hope, at least, is that the aggregate welfare of society would
benefit, thus making government provision of environmental amenities
23
that are Kaldor-Hicks, albeit not Pareto, superior.
Haddock indicates the "plausible prospect of a Kaldor-Hicks
improvement" 24 but adds that governmental suasion towards the
provision of a set of amenities desired by, say, an articulate
An externality is defined as potentially relevant when the activity, to the
extent that it is actually performed, generates any desire on the part of the
externally benefited (damaged) party (A) to modify the behaviour of the
party empowered to take action (B) through trade, persuasion,
compromise, agreement, convention, collective action, etc. An externality
which, to the extent that it is performed, exerts no such influence is
defined as irrelevant....
Id. at 373-74.
20. Haddock, supra note 7, at 387.
21. Id. at 38-40.
22. Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 19, at 374 ("'gains from trade' characterise the
Pareto-relevant externality, trade that takes the form of some change in the activity of B as
his part of the bargain"). Unlike Kaldor-Hicks superiority, where it suffices that gains from
a rule or action exceed losses, Pareto superiority requires that losers actually are
compensated, so that, while winners gain, none is worse off. See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-16 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing generally Pareto and
Kaldor-Hicks superiority).
23. Kaldor-Hicks analysis advances the interests of the wealthy, since the maximum
that each individual would choose to pay for any option often is a function of wealth. A
weighted version of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion could adjust for income or other factors. See
Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1419,1451-52 (1998).
24. Haddock, supra note 7, at 403.
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environmental interest group, could lead to "a Kaldor-Hicks deterioration rather than an improvement-even in principle those who lose
could not possibly be fully compensated from the beneficiaries' gains." 25
The balance of this article considers two interrelated
vulnerabilities of governmental provision of environmental amenities;
the ease by which the value of collective environmental amenities might
be inflated and the temptation of government to "pay" for an inflated
level of amenities though the partial confiscation of an endowment, such
as landowner property rights.
II. THE VALUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES
Professor Haddock focuses upon a world containing two types
of goods, "market goods," benefiting only their owners, and
"environmental goods" (e.g., forests and meadows), which provide
"substantial spillover amenities to other members of the community." 26
This Manichean division permits the construction of a basic model
following the scientific method.27 The scientific method is useful in
demonstrating that amenities might not be policy-relevant. In the actual
formulation of sound and coherent policy, however, accurate knowledge
of individual and societal goals and endowments, coupled with the
presence of well-defined property rights, is essential.
A. Measuring Amenity Values
In consensual market transactions, there is no reason for
government officials to appraise the relative value of the goods
exchanged, since the consenting parties regard themselves as gaining
2s
from it.
Each party to the agreement prefers it to any alternatives and
thereby has maximized value and minimized costs.29 Where government
contemplates filling an asserted need for collective goods, however, it
must ascertain the aggregate demand for that good.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 41.
Id. at l.
Id. at 1-2.
See James M. Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transaction

Cost, reprinted in ECONOMICS: BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 161

(Robert D. ToUison & Victor J. Vanberg eds., 1987), quoted in Todd J. Zywicki, A UnanimityReinforcing Model ofEfficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison ofCommon Law
and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 961,
974 n.42 (1996).
29. See Zywicki, supra note 28, at 966 n.12.
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The problem of ascertaining values in welfare economics is
vexing. Law and economics scholars Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell
recently argued that legal rules should be based exclusively on
considerations of well-being:
The notion of well-being used in welfare economics
... incorporates in a positive way everything that an
individual might value - goods and services that the
individual can consume, social and environmental amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic
feelings for others, and so forth....The only limit on what is
included in well-being is to be found in the minds of
30
individuals themselves, not in the minds of analysts.
Professor Richard Fallon has criticized Kaplow and Shavell for
criticizing the lack of clarity in the work of other theorists but failing
themselves to define anything more clearly than what they described as
"the central importance of the concept of well-being to welfare
economics." 31 In fairness, however, it would be hard to expect a more
objective reply. Since modem economists do not purport to measure a
given individual's overall utility function objectively and overwhelmingly reject interpersonal comparisons of utility or satisfaction, it
would be difficult to envision how aggregate welfare functions could be
32
generated for the society as a whole.
Measuring values pertaining to the environment is particularly
difficult. The primary dictionary meanings of "environment" refer to
background events or to the "whole complex of.. .factors that act upon
an organism or an ecological community, [or alternatively,] the
aggregate of social and cultural conditions...that influence the life of an
34
individual or community." 33 Gestalt problems lie in every direction.

Cost-benefit analysis has become a standard, and increasingly
legislatively mandated, tool for discerning the efficacy of regulatory

30.

Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18-19 (2002).

31. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 979,
987-88 n.39 (2003) (quoting KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 16).
32. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 53-57 (1992).
33. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 760 (1993).
34. Gestalt theory is the relationship of figure to ground, where figure is a form made
perspicuous by its perceived difference from a ground, context, or structure that lies
behind or beyond it. See T.R. Miles, Gestalt Theory, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 31823 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
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policy. 35 However, the concept is controversial, with some asserting that
the methodology of cost-benefit analysis is flawed. 36 In particular, deep
ecologists have rejected in toto the use of cost-benefit analysis with
respect to the environment. They argue, for example, "that if access to
nature is a right, then cost-benefit analysis breaks down. In other words,
there is no amount of money which can compensate for irreversible and
irreparable damage to nature." 37 Others assert that future generations
have "inviolable rights" to environmental resources -rights we must
value as much as our own. Thus, they attack the familiar practice of
discounting the present value of future environmental amenities because
they are deferred. 38
Such assertions about environmental values and the value of the
environment are expressed with considerable conviction. However,
claims and demands based on the rights of nature and of future
generations are not falsifiable, hence not scientific in nature. 39 They are
political appeals that others should defer to the sensibilities of the
claimants, dressed up in rights talk.4°
Since many environmental amenities are not traded, there are no
transaction prices to indicate their benefits. Passive uses of amenities do
not generate output that might be measured. The contingent valuation
method has been used by some researchers to survey how much a
representative sample population values passive environmental uses.41
These passive uses include "option value," which measures willingness
to pay to reserve the right to use the resource in the future, and
35. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutionsfor
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1343, 1344 (2002) (discussing growth of
cost-benefit analysis).
36. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?,29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 913, 929-30 (2000) (asserting bias in much cost-benefit analysis methodology).
37. Edwin R. McCullough, Through the Eye of a Needle: The Earth's Hard Passage Back to
Health, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LmG. 389, 436-437 (1995) (citing ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY
COMMuNITY AND LIFESTYLE (1989). Naess coined the term "deep ecology" in 1973. Id. at
415.

38. Id. at 437 n.180 (quoting Clive L. Splash, Economics, Ethics, and Long-Term Environmental Damages, 15 ENVTL. ETHIcs 117, 127 (1993)).
39.

See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF ScIENTIFIc

KNOWLEDGE 33-59 (3d ed. 1969).
40.

See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL

DisCOURSE (1991) (asserting that the recent tendency to reframe requests for privileges as
demands that "rights" be respected has hindered political dialogue).
41. See, e.g., Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods?
Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHi. L.
REV. 493 (1994). See also John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U.
CEH. L. REV. 331 (1995) (presenting a thorough account of uses and limitations of this
technique).
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When option and existence values are employed to
calculate an imputed market-clearing price that includes
non-market benefits, the results are startling. The imputed
market benefits of public lands devoted to recreation and
preservation far exceed the economic benefits of
commodity extraction uses. Furthermore, the data suggest
that the value of preservation, a non-use, overwhelms the
economic benefits of recreation and commodity uses.43
Existence value has its ardent proponents. 44
Other scholars, however, are quite skeptical of option and
existence value analysis. 45 They question the reliability of specific
techniques and, more fundamentally, they assert that "the main problem
with contingent valuation of environmental goods is conceptual, not
methodological."46
Notable supporters of environmentalism have claimed that the
environmental movement is successful because it is in accord with the
moral imperatives of the times. According to Professor Richard Lazarus,
"Professor Dan Farber was the first to suggest that modem
environmental laws may have resulted from a 'republican moment'- an
"'outburst[] of democratic participation and ideological politics"'created by widespread and then-rising public demand for environmental

42. See Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 140, 145 (1999).
43. Id. at 145-46.
44. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the
Global Environment, 83 GEo. L.J. 2131, 2170 (1995) (stating that a "[njonuse value, no less
than use value, is a genuine component of economic welfare, regardless of whether this
nonuse value is shared by others, and even if others view these preferences as absurd.
From this perspective, if ethical considerations make some preferences illegitimate, those
who wish to exclude these preferences from a cost-benefit calculation must bear the burden
of justifying this exclusion in terms of moral philosophy.").
45. See generally CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITIcAL ASSESSMENT (.A. Hausman ed.,

1993). See also Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29
ENVTL. L. 765, 780-83 (1999) (asserting that asking non-experts to price selected
environmental amenities independently results in their being overvalued).
46. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1105, 1126 (2000) (asserting, inter alia, that
respondents asked for existence values register zero or unrealistically high valuations,
provide valuations that are invariant across vastly different amenities, are inconsistent or
intransitive, and are sensitive to the order and wording of the questions).
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protection."47 Lazarus added that the significance of the "republican
moment" was that without it "environmental protection laws would
never exist because of their radically redistributive nature." 48 The fact
that Earth Day might have been a transformative moment for many, of
course, does not negate the old Washington story of the symbiotic
relationship between established commercial interests seeking to burden
their competitors and reformers who came to do good and stayed to do
49
well.
An additional consideration is framing theory, which relates the
present discussion of valuation to the temptation to pay for
environmental amenities by redefining property rights.50 "Framing" is
the establishment of a context in which valuation decisions are made.
Individuals tend to perceive the value of resources to be higher when
they regard them as being owned by themselves rather than by others. 51
Researchers have found that the value respondents placed on a given
natural resource could vary by 300 to 2000 percent, and they attribute
much of that variance to the fact that "if the public views itself as the
owner of a natural resource, valuation estimates will be much higher
52
than if the public believes that others own the natural resource."
B. Additional Problems in Measuring Environmental Values
Determining the value of environmental amenities raises
problems in addition to those inherent in valuing collective goods, even
those of a passive nature. Haddock defines "environmental goods" as
47. Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of "Republican Moment" in Environmental Law, 87
MINN. L. REV. 999, 999 (2003) (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in
Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (quoting, in turn, James G. Pope,
Republican Moments: The Role of DirectPopularPower in the American ConstitutionalOrder,139
U. PA. L. REv. 287, 292 (1990))).
48. Id. at 1000.
49. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The
Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TuL. L. REv. 845 (1999)
(asserting that command and control environmental regulation has cartel-like effects that
benefit selected industries and organized environmental interests); Jonathan R. Macey,
Public Choice and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICIONARY OF EcONOMICS AND THE
LAW 171, 173 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (emphasizing special interest benefit of environmental regulation).
50. See infra Part III.
51. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions,
59 J. Bus. S251, S257-62 (1986); Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSp. 193, 196-97 (1991). See also William A. Fischel, The
Offer/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A ConstitutionalChoice Perspective, 15
INTL REv. L. & ECON. 187 (1995).
52. Levy & Friedman, supra note 41, at 495.
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resources that provide "substantial spillover amenities to other members
of the community," 53 implying that it is human demand that must be
satisfied. Yet, from the term "environmental," it is not self evident what
organism or ecological or cultural community should be preferred. Some
might term Haddock's approach "shallow environmentalism" and
"anthropocentric" because "it views humans as the source of all value
and ascribes only use value to nature. Deep ecology recognizes the
intrinsic values of all living beings and views humans as just one
particular strand in the web of life."5 4
For many committed environmentalists, it is difficult to take a
piecemeal approach, focusing on one amenity or another, or even to
speak of externalities, in a world where "nature knows best"55 and
"everything is connected to everything else."5 6 Furthermore, the "ethical
concept of 'deep ecology' refers to the notion that nature and nonhuman
forms of life hold intrinsic value irrespective of the utility or value
57
humans place on them."
The United States has not adopted the straightforward approach
of preserving environmental amenities only to the extent that they
benefit people for aesthetic or other reasons, and employing efficient
administrative means such as pollution taxes to do so.58 Rather, "the
tailormade command approach remains the nation's predominant means
of addressing pollution."5 9 Statutes expressing environmental
aspirations, such as the Endangered Species Act,6° have been treated
literally by the courts so as to impose mandates "to halt and reverse the
61
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."
53.
54.
55.

Haddock, supra note 7, at 384.
Fritjof Capra, Ecologically Conscious Management, 22 ENVTL. L. 529,534 (1992).
This is Barry Commoner's "Third Law of Ecology." See BARRY COMMONER, THE

CLOSING CIRCLE 41 (1971).

56. Id. at 33.
57. Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, Sustainabilityand Environmental Justice: Is
the FutureClean and Black?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,968, 10,975 (2001) (citing ALDO LEOPOLD, A
SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949)).
58. The classic exposition of this position is WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS:
THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974).

59. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or PrairieChickens: The Uncertain Searchfor Optimal
Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1127,1128 (1999).
60. See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 917, 934 (2001) (noting the
"aspirational nature of environmental law").
61. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,154 (1978) (emphasis added).
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number
of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would
require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which
Congress has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not
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A problem related to the valuation of environmental amenities is
their asserted status as "merit goods." The term refers to goods that
society deems so beneficial to consumers that its private provision is
worthy of public subsidy. However, it encompasses the societal
provision of goods for those who are unwilling, as well as unable, to pay
for them. 62 Thus, accurate data indicating that the public's aggregate
demand for a specified collective environmental amenity was not policy
relevant might be rejected by those urging that government provide it
nevertheless. 63 The melding of ascribed preferences with contingent
valuation unveils the essential nature of the enterprise as being not one
of positive inquiry, but rather as normative and intended to impress
particular environmental policy preferences upon others. While
preferences revealed through market transactions are not perfect proxies
for value,64 they are grounded in actual behavior and thus are limited in
scope. For this reason, "[a]ttempts to bring a more social concept of value
into economics.. .according to which cultural traditions or communities
have value beyond what individuals place on them, have never caught
on among economists." 65
III. PROVIDING ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES THROUGH
REDEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS
Assuming that government decides that it would be KaldorHicks efficient to create new environmental amenities, privately owned

minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums
of public money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations
Committees were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the
snail darter. We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the
Endangered Species Act require precisely that result.
Id. at 172-73.
62.

See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC

ECONOMY 13-14 (1959) (asserting that "situations may arise, within the context of a
democratic community, where an informed group is justified in imposing its decision upon
others").
63. See, e.g., Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public
Assistance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 847, 885 (2002) (asserting that "health care is a 'merit good,'
which is 'something that in our ethical judgment everybody should have, whether or not
they are willing or able to buy it"') (emphasis added) (quoting BARBARA R. BERGMANN,
SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM POVERTY: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM
FRANCE 131 (1996)).

64. A classic illustration is the expensive hormone obtained by the wealthy family for a
slight enhancement of its child's athletic prowess, obtained over the lower bid of the poor
family desiring the hormone to save its child's life.
65. Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of
Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 825 (1989).
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parcels of land or other land use rights would have to be obtained. State
purchase is the most direct solution. It could be supplemented, as
needed, by the exercise of eminent domain to avoid bilateral monopoly
or strategic bargaining problems. These devices require payment from
the public fisc, thus enhancing the accountability of government officials.
However, public officials are not always eager to test their estimates of
the value of amenities by demanding budget increases for their agencies
or tax increases from the legislature or voters. 66 Indeed, circumvention of
the requirement for purchase or condemnation at fair market value
might be the sine qua non of obtaining amenities that are considered
Kaldor-Hicks efficient in the first place. The efficacy of changes
advocated to remove alleged externalities is thereby predicated upon the
creation of a new externality.
A. Common Law Property, the Right to Development, and Common
Law Nuisance
Officials often prefer to obtain their objects through regulation.
As Justice Scalia has noted, "The politically attractive feature of
regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers to be achieved that
could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be
achieved 'off budget,' with relative invisibility and thus relative
67
immunity from normal democratic processes."
Therefore, it is not surprising that government would attempt to
pay for environmental amenities not through taxation, but rather
through the redefinition, and arguable confiscation, of private property
rights. Since private ordering furthers individual liberty, 68 and private
property is the best guarantee of its perpetuation, 69 the diminution of

66.

See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part).

67.

Id.

68. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 895 n.199 (1997)
("conservative contractarians.. regard efficiency as a presumptively legitimate norm
precisely because it best serves our preference for private ordering through contract").
69. See FREDRIcH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1956).
[T]he system of private property is the most important guaranty of

freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those
who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is
divided among many people acting independently that nobody has
complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do
with ourselves.
Id. at 103-04.
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property rights for the purpose of enhancing environmental amenities
would create a negative externality of the first magnitude. 70
Under common law, what now is termed "the environment" was
the backdrop to private property. The creation of disturbances in the
environment that would detract from owners' reasonable enjoyment of
their property could be prosecuted under the rubric of private or public
nuisance. 71 Since the 1960s, "the environment," as encapsulated in
environmental law, is an aggregate of topics, such as clean air, clean
water, and the protection of endangered species, in which statutory
obligations have been created. Given the arbitrary quality of environmental statutes and the complexity of ensuing regulations, some72scholars
advocate that the common law nuisance approach is preferable.
From colonial days on, the United States was settled by immigrants attracted by fee simple ownership of land that they could farm
and develop.73 "The normal bundle of property rights contains no
priority for land in its natural condition; it regards use, including
development, as one of the standard incidents of ownership." 74 To be
sure, the use rights of individuals were qualified by their duty not to
interfere with the reasonable use of neighboring lands, enforced by the
law of nuisance. These principles were summed up a decade ago in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,75 where Justice Scalia described that
[iun the case of land,...the notion.. .that title is somehow
held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is
inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the
70. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992). See also Richard A. Epstein, The

"Necessary" History of Property and Liberty, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2003); Steven J. Eagle, The
Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 77 (2002).
71. Where the tortious act of one landowner precludes another from making
reasonable use of his land, the victim may sue under private nuisance or may agree to
tolerate the injury under contract. Where the disturbance caused by a nuisance tortfeasor is
widespread, public nuisance permits the local prosecutor to bring suit to vindicate the
rights of the affected owners, thus dealing with the collective action problem. See Karol
Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for
Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55,59-65 (2002).
72. See, e.g., Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or
Repeal?, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 73, 88 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle
eds., 1993).
73. See ELY, supra note 70, at 11.
74.

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 123 (1985).
75. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture. 76
Such limitations "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership." 77
The rise of the environmental movement has challenged
development as a fundamental attribute of land ownership. Academic
critics charged that the historic abundance of land in America has
encouraged a "consumptive, aggrandizing culture." 78 In 1972, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court declared, in the well-known case of Just v.
Marinette County,79 that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute and
unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as
use it [sic] for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others." 80
B. Devices to Make Development a Collective Right
In an important sense, governmental regulation of private rights
makes them collective rights. Beneficiaries of regulation rapidly assume
proprietary attitudes, 81 and those benefiting from environmental
regulations also want to institutionalize their gains by establishing a
grounding for them in property law. 82 Since the common law assumed
that private landowners possessed development rights short of nuisance,
obtaining environmental amenities through other than consensual
76. Id. at 1028.
77. Id. at 1029.
78. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REv. 77, 96
(1995).
79. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (holding that a landfill could not be placed upon
certain wetlands).
80. Id. at 768. Just was reiterated in Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 535
(Wis. 1996). The phrase "rights of others" refers here not to common law rights against
nuisance, but to newly-minted rights to be bordered by land with an unchanged, if not well
defined, "essential natural character."
81.
See, e.g., J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN

THE UNITED STATES (1997) (advocating compensation for utility companies' "stranded
costs" in newly deregulated markets); ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 22-51 (1977) (asserting

that zoning is a de facto neighborhood collective private property right).
82. It is a tribute to the potency of the concept of property that those asserting new
social entitlements may seek to institutionalize them by bestowing the status of property
upon them. Various government welfare programs and occupational licenses have been the
subject of such efforts, with varying degrees of success. The seminal work is Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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transactions requires a redefinition of traditional property rights, or
property-nuisance baselines. 83 Professor Daniel Farber advocated an
"environmental baseline" against which public and private development
activities could be measured. "To the extent feasible without incurring
costs grossly disproportionate to any benefit, the government should
eliminate significant environmental risks."84 Farber's proffered baseline
and qualification have been attacked as "wobbly" and insufficient to
overcome the normal presumption for private ordering.8 5
Beginning with the idea that protection of the environment
justifies regulating the use of private land short of finding a nuisance, it
is only a short step to say that development is actually or potentially
harmful 86 and that the rights to permissible development constitute a
common pool. Our predominant metaphor for that pool is Garrett
Hardin's evocative "Tragedy of the Commons."87 The "tragedy," in this
often-cited view, is that each person has a huge incentive to overexploit a
common resource, since many others surely will do likewise and are
unlikely to be dissuaded by isolated examples of self-restraint. As
Haddock and Lynne Kiesling recently noted, the correct metaphor is
"The Tragedy of Open Access," 88 since commons are not unowned, but
are rather the collective property of defined groups.89 The distinction is
important because, contrary to the "tragedy" metaphor, ownership in

83. Robert Ellickson has argued that the "normal behavior" within a community ought
to define the landowners' baseline of entitlement to use rights against the state. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
385,419-21 (1977).
84. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 131 (1999).

85. Richard A. Epstein, Too Pragmaticby Half, 109 YALE L.J. 1639,1641-42 (2000).
86. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (discussing the "precautionary
principle").
87. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
88. David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 545, 557 (2002). Haddock and Kiesling's extensive treatment of the commons
is based on Louis DeAlessi's model of a continuum bounded by open access and private
property separated by a continuous varied set of rights among owners. Louis DeAlessi,
Gains from Private Property: The Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICr, AND LAW 90 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). See also Henry

E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.LEGAL STUD. 131
(2000) (describing complex pattern of private and common land uses in medieval fields).
89. The resources may be open access to group members but are private property to

outsiders. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights
Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 817 n.12 (2003) (noting the earlier formulation:
"commons on the inside, property on the outside," by Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of

Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129,
155 (1998)).
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common "can yield sustainable exploitation of the resource in a way that
is impossible in open access." 9°
Under the common pool approach, a logical way to apportion
the limited amount of permitted development might be unitization,
which some states impose on ownership of lands above fugitive oil and
gas. 91 Under such an arrangement, the landowners in the relevant
ecoshed (i.e., unit) would share the value of permissible development
through being accorded transferable development rights (TDRs) that a
developer would have to purchase in specified quantities. However, that
device is employed rarely. 92 Instead, localities typically establish various
use zones and grant development permits through the use generally
unconstrained and ad hoc methods. 93 Occasionally, development is
metered through intricate schemes whereby builders acquire points
toward an eventual permit. 94 As Dean James Huffman has noted,
The bias against property rights and markets remains
strong among most environmental organizations, nowhere
more than in the context of concerns about ecosystems and
biodiversity. Threats to ecosystems and biodiversity are
viewed as classic common pool resource problems, which
will only be solved through command and control
regulation or central planning. 95
Under the "public trust" theory, which dates to the Romans, the
sea and its shores, running water, and the air were deemed the common
property of mankind. Navigable waters were legally available for public
use in fishing and commerce. 96 The English common law perpetuated
those principles, with the gloss that these rights were owned by the

90. Id. at 817 n.11 (citing ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECrIVE ACTION (1990)). See also Michael Taylor, The Economics and

Politics of PropertyRights and Common Pool Resources, 32 NAT. REsOuRcEsJ. 633 (1992).
91. See generally Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum
PropertyRights in the United States, 31 J.LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002).
92. For an exception, see Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1989). In
other so-called TDR schemes, government confiscates development rights through the use
of overly-stringent zoning. The rights are then repackaged and transferred to others.

93.

See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, S.J.,
Essay: Reflections on the Demise of the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act, 86 GEO. L.J. 101, 102 (1997) (observing that "the decisionmakers in zoning
cases have broad discretion; sometimes it almost appears that their discretion is
standardless").
94. The seminal case is Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291
(N.Y. 1972).
95. James L. Huffman, Marketing Biodiversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 421,421 (2002).

96.

See Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the

Peoples' Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1980).
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sovereign in trust for the public. 97 The Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed those principles over a century ago.98
During the past 30 years, however,
many state courts have expanded the geographical reach
and substantive scope of the public trust doctrine. In
particular, a spate of recent decisions have extended it to
cover resources beyond navigable waterways, while also
finding that the trust protects public uses in such resources
other than the traditional triad of commerce, navigation,
and fishing.99
The extent that the public trust doctrine can trump takings considerations remains very controversial. 100 Nevertheless, the substantive
content of the doctrine comports with the environmentalist agenda, and
its notion of perpetuity'0 resonates with the environmentalist argument
that cost-benefit analysis in the provision of environmental amenities
must be constrained because it is unethical to discount the needs of
10 2
future generations.
Another factor auguring toward collectivization of development
rights is the "precautionary principle." 10 3 The 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development declared, "Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation." 1°4 As described by Professor Cass Sunstein,
"In its strongest and most distinctive forms, the principle imposes a
97. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980).
98. Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892).
99. David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law:
Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust "Exceptions" and the (Mis) Use of InvestmentBacked Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339,357 (2002).
100. See James Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights:
The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987).
101. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (asserting that the trust "can never be lost, except as
to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein").
102. See JOHN O'NEILL, ECOLOGY, POLICY AND PoLmcs: HUMAN WELL-BEING AND THE
NATURAL WORLD 60 (1993).

103.

See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary

Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF

IMPLEMENTATION 3 (Int'l Envtl. Law & Policy Series No. 31, David Freestone & Ellen Hey
eds., 1996) (discussing the origins and evolution of the precautionary principle).
104. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Env't and
Dev., Annex I, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), availableat http://www.un
(last visited Apr. 8,
ep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticleID=1163
2004).
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burden of proof on those who create potential risks, and it requires
regulation of activities even if it cannot be shown that those activities are
likely to produce significant harms."105 Sunstein finds the strong form of
the precautionary principle to be "literally paralyzing -forbidding
inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between." 106 As he
notes, the principle, although not the term, is seeping into domestic
American legislation. 107 The precautionary principle has been defended
by others as a useful guide to action that compensates for psychological
misperceptions of risk.1 8
Yet another purported justification for the cutting back of private
development rights without compensation is that much of the value
enjoyed by landowners was supplied by government construction of
infrastru :ture and provision of many other direct and indirect benefits
that were capitalized in the value of land. Withdrawals of these benefits
are not unconstitutional takings, but rather the retraction of earlier
government "givings." 1 9 "Givings recapture" has been advocated as a
method of funding the provision of environmental amenities. 110 In fact,
"givings" represent either (1) expenditures of public funds for private
purposes, as such contrary to due process of law, or (2) expenditures
furthering public health, safety, or welfare, albeit with incidental private
benefits.
The trend toward the collectivization of development in the
name of enhancement of environmental amenities is accelerating under
the banner of "smart growth," a set of general policies designed to
reduce "sprawl" (i.e., low density development) and to encourage urban
infill and mass transportation."' "Smart growth" would move the
United States toward the European system, where owners typically must

105. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle,151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1003
(2003).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1005 (citing the Clean Air Act § 109,42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000) (requiring an
"adequate margin of safety.. .to protect the public health") and quoting, inter alia, Lead
Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that "Congress directed
the Administrator to err on the side of caution")).
108. David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 97 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1315, 1316-17 (2003).
109. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
110. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
PropertyInterests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 295 (2003).
111. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Carrie Richter, Out of the Chaos: Towards a National
System of Land-Use Procedures, 34 URB. LAW. 449, 472-83 (2002). See also the American
Planning Association's massive GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL
STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (2002), available at

http://www.planning.org/guidebook/Guidebook.htm (last visited Apr. 8,2004).
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obtain government permission to put land to new uses. 112 While "smart
growth" is advocated by professional planners, environmentalists, and
3
many public officials, it has proven very divisive."
The increasing demand for public provision of environmental
amenities, and the redefinition of property that would be entailed, makes
the determination of whether the demand is policy-relevant more
important and difficult than ever.

112. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1091-92, 1092 n.47 (4th ed.
1998) (noting that the English Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 paid landowners
because the Act took away "their right to develop the land [in toto]," but that "[playments
from the fund were not called 'compensation,' but rather 'ex gratia payments,' because the
[English government]...would not admit that...any compensation at all was payable").
113. See, e.g., Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth
Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873 (2000) (supporting smart growth); Bernard H. Siegan,
Smart Growth and Other Infirmities of Land Use Controls, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693 (2001)
(opposing smart growth).

